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Staying in the Delaware Corporate Governance Lane:  
Fee Shifting Bylaws and a Legislative Reaffirmation of the Rules of the Road
J. Robert Brown, Jr.1
On May 12, 2015, the Delaware State Senate passed Senate Bill No. 75.2  The bill, 
if it becomes law, would amend Section 102 of the Delaware General Corporation Law 
(DGCL) to prohibit the certificate of incorporation from containing “any provision that 
would impose liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corpora-
tion or any other party in connection with an internal corporate claim. . . ”3  Similar lan-
guage would apply to bylaws adopted under Section 109(b) of the DGCL.4
The legislation bars fee shifting provisions in the context of “internal corporate claims.” 
These include derivative and other claims “(i) that are based upon a violation of a duty by a 
current or former director or officer or stockholder in such capacity, or (ii) as to which this 
title confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Chancery.”5  The language, therefore, applies to 
challenges premised on a breach of a board’s fiduciary obligations and claims arising under 
Title 8 of the Delaware Code, a title that includes the DGCL.
The ban does not, however, explicitly extend to other types of actions.  Claims brought 
under the federal securities laws, although often brought by shareholders (or former share-
holders), can6 but may not always7 be predicated upon a breach of duty by officers and 
1 Professor of Law & Director, Corporate & Commercial Law Program, University of Denver Sturm College 
of Law. 
2 S. 75, 148 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2015), available at http://legis.delaware.gov/LIS/lis148.nsf/vwL
egislation/87E715E89A8C4EE785257E2F00641F25?Opendocument
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102.
4 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 109(b).  
5 Senate Bill No. 75.  
6 As the Supreme Court has noted, “[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b–5.” 
Basic v. Levinson, 485 US 224, 239 n. 17 (1988).  As a result, actions under the securities fraud provisions 
are often predicated upon a breach of a duty.   
7 Actions alleging false disclosure under the antifraud provisions of the securities laws are often brought 
against the corporation.  See Matrixx Initiatives v. Siracusano, 131 S.Ct. 1309 (2011).  Nonetheless, such 
*   *   *
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directors.  At least one commentator has raised the possibility that this “oversight” may 
have been deliberate.8 
There is, however, a more likely explanation.  The authority granted to corporations 
in Sections 102 and 109 of the DGCL was not intended to, and does not reach beyond, 
“internal corporate claims.”9 Extending the ban on fee shifting provisions to other types of 
actions is, therefore, unnecessary.  
This interpretation is apparent from language in the two sections prohibiting bylaws 
and certificate provisions that are contrary to, or inconsistent with, “the law”10 and from the 
consequences that would arise from a different reading of the DGCL.11     
First, to the extent allowing bylaws and certificate provisions that restrict federal causes 
of action, issues of preemption and enforceability would arise.12  Courts generally do not 
apply state imposed restrictions in claims arising from federally created rights.13  Thus, in 
actions seeking enforcement of the securities laws, courts have refused to apply state law 
claims also typically involve allegations against individuals, particularly officers and directors.  See id. at 
1313 (“Respondents, plaintiffs in a securities faraud class action, allege that petitioners, Matrixx Initiatives, 
Inc., and three of its executives . . . failed to disclose reports of a possible link between its leading product, a 
cold remedy, and loss of smell, rendering statements made by Matrixx misleading.”).  The ban on fee shifting 
bylaws may well apply in these types of actions.  
8 See John C. Coffee, Delaware Throws a Curveball, The CLS Blue Sky Blog (Mar. 16, 2015),  http://
clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/03/16/delaware-throws-a-curveball (“Before we assume that the narrow 
phrasing of Sections 102 and 109 was an oversight by the Corporation Law Council, we need to consider the 
alternative possibility: namely, that they deliberately wrote it narrowly. Why? This is speculative and may 
sound cynical, but the Corporation Law Council may have wanted to cover only traditional ‘Delaware-style’ 
litigation”).
9 As the courts in Delaware have recognized, actions under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities 
laws are very different from internal corporate claims.  See  In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litiga-
tion, C.A. No. 8885-VCL  (Del. Ch. May 20, 2015) (“A Rule 10b-5 claim under the federal securities laws 
is a personal claim akin to a tort claim for fraud. The right to bring a Rule 10b-5 claim is not a property right 
associated with shares, nor can it be invoked by those who simply hold shares of stock.”).  Whether Sections 
102 and 109 were intended to permit provisions that restricted shareholder access to the courts is another 
question beyond the scope of this piece. See Corporations – Stockholders:  Powers of Majority – Expulsion of 
Competing Shareholders By Amending By-Laws, 33 Harv. L. rev. 979 (May 1920) (noting that “restrictions 
on the right of members to sue the corporation” have “uniformly been held invalid.”).  
10 Section 109(b) allows bylaws that are not “inconsistent with the law.”  tit. 8 § 109(b).  Section 102(b) al-
lows provisions in the certificate that are “not contrary to the laws of this State.”  Tit. 8 §102(b).
11 Such an approach is also consistent with the view that bylaws and certificates generally regulate the “inter-
nal affairs” of a corporation.  See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238 (Del. 2008). 
See also  J. Robert Brown, Jr.,  The Future Direction of Delaware Law (Including a Brief Exegesis on Fee 
Shifting Bylaws),  92 DULR Online 49, 53 (May 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2601101
12 See Coffee, supra note 8 (discussing the possibility of preemption).  
13 See CILP Associates LP v. PriceWaterhouse Cooper, LLP, 735 F.3d 114, 122 (2nd Cir. 2013) (“Whether a 
party has standing to assert claims under Section 10(b) is a question of federal law.”).
14
provisions that limit standing to record, rather than beneficial, owners14 and state law re-
quirements mandating the posting of security.15  
Second, allowing bylaws and certificate provisions that went beyond “internal corpo-
rate claims” would have the potential to interfere with other causes of action authorized 
under Delaware law.  The Delaware Blue Sky statute, for example, provides a private right 
of action for defrauded shareholders and other investors.16 To the extent not deemed an “in-
ternal corporate claim,” these claims would be discouraged or even eliminated through the 
implementation of fee shifting bylaws, effectively upending a carefully crafted statutory 
framework put in place by the Delaware legislature.17  
Third, such an interpretation could cause conflict with the laws of other states.18  In 
affirming the authority to adopt Blue Sky Statutes, the US Supreme Court recognized the 
right to regulate securities transactions “within the state.”19  To the extent that fee shift-
ing bylaws remained applicable to these actions, Delaware corporations would be able to 
throw up roadblocks to fraud claims brought by shareholders in other states.20
14 See Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 727 (2d Cir. 1971) (“Federal law must be consulted to decide 
whether there is standing to sue under the Exchange Act, and that federal law confers standing upon benefi-
cial shareholders”).
15 See Fielding v. Allen, 181 F.2d 163, 168 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 340 US 817 (1950) (“we think that the right 
of a stockholder to sue on his corporation’s federal cause of action is itself federal in nature and therefore not 
subject to special requirements for cognate actions under state law”). 
16 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §73-605(a).  
17 With respect to internal corporate claims, the impact of fee shifting bylaws has been described as elimi-
nating shareholder rights.  See Q&A Accompanying Draft Legislation Banning Fee Shifting Bylaws, Pre-
pared by the Corporation Law Council, Delaware State Bar Association, 2015, available at http://www.
law.du.edu/documents/corporate-governance/legislation/delaware-stat-revisions/Council-Second-Proposal-
FAQs-3-6-15.pdf (“The purpose and effect of these provisions is to significantly, if not completely, deter the 
enforcement of stockholder protections. Stockholder suits are generally brought by one or more stockholders 
on behalf of, or to benefit, many stockholders. Very few, if any, stockholders will be willing to risk individu-
ally paying the corporation’s legal fees on behalf of other stockholders. Accordingly, fee-shifting effectively 
eliminates stockholder rights, because stockholder litigation is the only method of enforcing them. This 
would be a radical change in the corporate landscape.”).  The provision would presumably have the same 
effect on other causes of actions that are regularly dismissed.  
18 Claims under state Blue Sky statutes do not implicate the internal affairs of a corporation.  Friese v. Supe-
rior Court of San Diego, 134 Cal.App.4th 693, 710 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that securities regulation in 
California “is not subject to the internal affairs doctrine”).  
19 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 US 539, 557 (1917) (“The provisions of the law, it will be observed, apply 
to dispositions of securities within the state, and while information of those issued in other states and foreign 
countries is required to be filed . . . , they are only affected by the requirement of a license of one who deals 
in them within the state.”) (emphasis in original).   See also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 US 624, 641 (1982) 
(noting that Blue Sky statutes do not violate commerce clause because they “only regulate[ ] transactions 
occurring within the regulating States.”).   
20 Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court has made it clear that state securities regulation is entirely distinct 
from a corporation’s internal affairs.  See Singer v. The Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 981 (Del. 1977) (“we 
do not read the [Blue Sky Law] as an attempt to introduce Delaware commercial law into the internal affairs 
of corporations merely because they are chartered here.”).  See also Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc. v. Bru-
ton, 1988 WL 32375, at 4 n 3 (Del. Ch. March 31, 1988) (noting that Singer “stands for the proposition that 
15
As a matter of legislative intent, therefore, it is not reasonable to assume that the 
Delaware legislature intended Sections 102 and 109 to be used to upend private rights 
of action under other titles of the Delaware Code, to raise issues of enforceability and 
preemption under the federal securities laws, or to interfere with the laws in other states. 
Moreover, an alternative interpretation would be inconsistent with the traditional approach 
taken by Delaware in the governance process.  The State is protective of its preeminent 
role in determining a corporation’s internal affairs21 and has opposed encroachment by 
other regulators.22 At the same time, courts have specifically rejected invitations to extend 
Delaware corporate law into areas already under the control of other regulators.23  Bylaws 
and certificate provisions that interfere with causes of action in other states or at the federal 
level do exactly that.  
The limitation on the reach of Sections 102 and 109 to “internal corporate claims” 
ensures that these conflicts will not occur and that the interpretation of bylaws and certifi-
cates adopted by Delaware corporations will remain within the purview of that State.   The 
language in Senate Bill 75 is consistent with this approach.  Given the existing limitations 
in the scope of the DGCL, broader language is unnecessary.  Adoption of the Bill, as cur-
rently drafted, will, therefore, effectively reaffirm existing limits on bylaws and certificates 
and will ensure that Delaware remains firmly within its own corporate governance lane.
*   *   *
the Legislature did not intend to introduce this state’s Blue Sky law into the internal affairs of corporations 
merely because they are organized under the laws of this state.”).  
21 See Vantage Point Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005).  
22 See Letter from James L. Holzman, Chair, Council of the Corporation Law Section, Delaware Bar Associa-
tion, to Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy, SEC, July 24, 2009 (commenting on proposed SEC rule; “We do so in this 
instance because we believe that the Access Proposal significantly implicates what the Commission properly 
notes is ‘the traditional role of the states in regulating corporate governance.’”), available at http://www.sec.
gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-65.pdf
23 See Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 539 (Del. 1996) (“We see no legitimate 
basis to create a new cause of action which would replicate, by state decisional law, the provisions of section 
14 of the 1934 Act.”).  See also Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 13 (Del. 1998) (declining to adopt a cause of 
action based upon “fraud on the market” in “deference to the panoply of federal protections that are available 
to investors in connection with the purchase or sale of securities of Delaware corporations”).  
